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Delaware’s Dominance: A Peculiar Illustration of American Federalism 
Robert B. Thompson 
 
 Who makes corporate law has often been as important as its substance.  The 
traditional presentation accepts state law as the predominant source of corporate rules and 
focuses on the “race between the states” dimension of the “who makes corporate law” 
question.  For the last half century or more the accepted wisdom has been that Delaware 
has won this race for corporation charters and the money that comes with it, although 
states and commentators probe for chinks in the Delawarean armor.  In many ways, this 
discussion is still framed by the key question of corporate law from the 1960s and 1970s:  
is Delaware’s dominance explained by a “race to the bottom” skewing corporate law in 
favor of management interests who influence state lawmaking at the expense of 
shareholders or by a “race to the top” with state law incorporating rules that reflect 
preferences made through markets.1  This race between the states, however,  cannot be 
understood without examining two other dimensions—the extent to which we rely on 
markets or government for corporate rule-making and the federalism dimension of 
apportioning responsibility between federal and state governments.   
For the first half of our country’s history after independence, none of the three 
dimensions was of particular importance.  Corporate law was almost entirely at the state 
level with some United States Supreme Court cases reinforcing the right of corporations 
                                                     
 Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center. 
 
1  See infra notes xx-xx. 
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to own property, make contracts, and to sue and be sued that had been commonly 
extended to collective entities in English law and elsewhere.2  Government regulation of 
entities (e.g. their permitted purposes, size, and duration) were common and followed 
from the sovereign’s capacity to create corporations.  Things changed in the last decade 
or so of the nineteenth century.  State authorization of corporations to own stock in other 
corporations and the decline of state ability to regulate foreign corporations opened the 
way for states to openly compete for corporations headquartered in neighboring states.  
The content of the state corporations statutes also dramatically changed.  “Laissez faire” 
statutes in New Jersey in 1896, soon followed elsewhere, signaled a shift to private 
ordering and markets at a time when the decline of ultra vires, quo waranto and 
regulation of foreign corporations first made it possible for a state to attract substantial 
incorporation business from its neighbors.  Some current illustrations of the race between 
the states, for example, bylaws limiting where suits can be brought, reflect this dimension 
as well. The regulatory impulse of the earlier corporations statutes, however, did not 
disappear.  It simply moved to federal law, setting up the federalism dimension of the 
“who makes corporate law” debate.   
This chapter examines the contemporary interaction of corporate law along these 
three dimensions with a particular focus on federalism.  In the same way that we often 
frame the race between the states in the examples of the 1960s and 1970s, the concepts of 
federalism that we bring to the discussion date from the New Deal and focus on whether 
the federal government will preempt state corporate law, usually by adding regulation to 
                                                     
2  For more discussion of the ideas developed in this paragraph see, See Robert B. Thompson, Why New 
Corporate Law Arises: Implications for the 21st Century, The Corporate Contract in Changing Times: Is Law 
Keeping Up? (forthcoming 2017 University of Chicago Press, Steven Davidoff Solomon, William Savitt & 
Randall Thomas, eds). 
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a space that state law has left to private ordering.3  Corporate law federalism is different 
than the classic constitutional doctrine of our history and bears only faint resemblance to 
contemporary federalism discussions in areas such as education, energy and 
environmental law.  An ”on-off “view of allocating law-making power between state or 
federal government has given way in other fields to a more nuanced view of interactive 
federalism.  This chapter presents the richer and more nuanced space of 21st century 
corporate law federalism that has some points in common with federalism discussion in 
other subject areas and some that reflect the particular history of the development of 
corporate law.  The last section suggests how this federalism dimension influences the 
race between the states dimension of who makes corporate law in a way that essentially 
has locked Delaware’s dominance in place. 
 
I. The Point of Inflection for “Who Makes Corporate Law” 
 
Delaware rose to preeminence in the incorporation market after a key point of 
inflection for corporate law.  Fort the first half of American history (to date) corporate 
law moved through waves of significant changes, all focused in state law:  acceptance of 
limited liability for shareholders, the rise of general incorporation statutes, a strong shift 
to director-centric corporate governance, and authorization of corporations’ owning 
stock in other corporations, among others.4   Then around the turn of the 20th century, 
Delaware quickly followed New Jersey in a move to a laissez-faire statute.  In the time 
since that point state corporation law has been much more stable in the now familiar 
                                                     
3 For discussion of traditional concepts of dual federalism see Part II infra. 
4  See infra, Part IA. 
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Delaware approach of default rules that can be modified by the parties but providing a 
governance structure centralized in the board and management with only a limited role 
for shareholders.  When Delaware and New Jersey abandoned the traditional state law 
regulation of corporate behavior at the end of the 19th century, that regulatory impulse 
did not die, it just moved to federal law.  Ever since, Delaware, and those other states 
who wish to compete with it, have remained free to focus on centralized governance and 
private ordering, adjusting as necessary to insure that the entity retained sufficient 
flexibility to adapt to new economic changes.  If the result was that directors and 
managers got too powerful, federal law picked up the slack, first in antitrust law and 
labor and consumer regulation of corporate behavior and increasingly by federalization 
of parts of the traditional Delaware space of core corporate governance.   
 
A. American corporate law in the 18th and 19th century 
There were very few business corporations at the time of the founding of the 
American republic.5  The corporate form passed down from the king’s government had 
been used mostly for religious or charitable purposes or quasi-public (bridge or turnpike) 
entities. Fundamental economic and financial changes as the industrial revolution spread 
increased the scale of business and the size of the market in which entrepreneurs could 
compete effectively.  By the 1830s, manufacturing corporations exceeded those in 
banking, insurance, and public service and the number was growing.6 There was a greater 
                                                     
5 Joseph Davis, 
6 Phillip A.. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 283, 301 (1990).  
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need for enterprises which assembled the capital from more than one person.7  There was 
a greater need for legal rule to reflect and facilitate these developments and to 
accommodate the political will evident in the Jacksonian era to democratize the 
availability of the corporate form. 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, there were many dramatic shifts in 
corporate law: 
• Limited liability for shareholders (and for officers and directors) became the legally 
provided norm (although liability for double the amount of money paid for shares was 
common even after limited liability was inserted into law);8 
• General incorporation statutes as opposed to special chartering by the legislature 
spread through the middle decades of the nineteenth century (although here, too, the 
change was gradual, not a dramatic on-off switch, as many states continued special 
chartering alongside general incorporation until late in the century9 and in Delaware, 
for example, the number of special charters greatly exceeded those provided under 
the general statute);10 
• Corporate law moved strongly toward centralized management, reflected in a shift 
from the importance of the general meeting of shareholders to broad powers for 
                                                     
7 Shaw Livermore, Early American Land Companies, Their Influence on Corporate Development 
(Commonwealth Fund) (1939). 
8 Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 
(1986). 
9 Eric Hilt, Corporations Law and the Shift Toward Open Access in the Antebellum United States, National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper # 21195 (2015). 
10 Samuel Arsht, The History of Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. 1 (1976). 
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directors11 and a centralized structure that could accommodate the rising influence of 
middle management;12 
• Late in the century, changes in corporate law permitted corporations to own stock in 
other corporations, permitting holding companies that facilitated companies doing 
business outside their state of incorporation when prior law had often prohibited such 
action.13 
All of these changes occurred in state law—one at a time, eventually spreading to most of 
the country. Federal incorporation was initially in some doubt under the constitution and 
seldom used.  The United States Supreme Court irregularly took up issues related to 
corporations, for example Dartmouth College in 1819,14 Bank of Augusta v.  Earle in 
1839 (that declined to find a constitutional right for corporations to operate outside their 
state of incorporation),15 and a series of constitutional cases after the Civil War that 
protected corporations’ rights to contract, own property and sue and be sued.16 
B. The Appearance of the Three Dimensions of “Who Makes Corporate Law” 
By the late 1880s all the elements of the modern corporation were in view, 
something that was not true a century before.  But none of the three dimensions of “who 
makes law” had yet to gather a critical mass.  In the 1890s, however, the competition and 
race between states for incorporation business accelerated, led by New Jersey.  Its chosen 
                                                     
11 E. Merrick Dodd, , Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law 1886-1936, 50 HARV. L. 
REV. 27, 40 (1936). 
12 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand, The Managerial Revolution in American Business, 1977 
(Belnap Press). 
13 See infra, notes xx-xx. 
14  
15 38 U.S. ( 5 Pet.) 517 (1839). 
16 Margaret Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015). 
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method of competition was to abandon the regulatory posture of prior corporate law in 
favor of what was termed “laissez faire” corporations statutes, thereby defining the 
regulatory/private ordering dimension.  The federal government’s continued adherence to 
a regulatory agenda as to corporations, first visible in antitrust laws, rules regarding 
employment and consumers, and limits on corporate political contributions, set up the 
federalism dimension of our topic.17 
This point of inflection is noticeable and dramatic.  Professor Joel Seligman 
termed it a “revolution wrought in the law of corporations” that “turned corporate law 
inside out.” 18 Professor (later Supreme Court Justice) Wiley Rutledge described this 
period as “destined eventually to reverse the historic policy of the states to place state 
policy fundamentally in opposition to that of the Federal government.”19 
New Jersey was the epicenter of this development, in part as its home state 
lawyers sought to take business from the big city just across the river.  Amendments to 
the New Jersey corporations statute in 1888 and 1889 authorized corporations to own 
stock in other corporations.20  This power proved very helpful when state courts in 
Louisiana, New York and Ohio found trusts (an innovation of clever lawyers for Standard 
Oil in the early 1880s) violated their still restrictive corporations statutes not permitting 
operation outside the state of incorporation.21  James Dill, one of the lawyers pushing this 
early statute returned in 1896 to draft liberalizations of New Jersey’s general 
incorporation act that removed limits on corporate duration, purpose, and size, explicitly 
                                                     
17 New Corporate Law supra note xx at yy. 
18 Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249 
(1976). 
19 Wiley D. Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 305 (1937). 
20 NJ statutes 
21 Horwitz, supra note xx at yy. 
8 
 
authorized carrying on business in other jurisdictions, provided for mergers and 
consolidations, and added new management flexibility like permitting director 
amendment of bylaws.22  New Jersey’s incorporation revenues quickly grew, noticeably 
at the expense of New York, and other states followed its lead, including Delaware in 
1899.  New Jersey gave up some of its advantage when President-elect Woodrow Wilson 
pushed reform in the state’s corporate law prior to leaving Trenton for Washington.23  As 
law students quickly learn, Delaware has long had the dominant position in the race 
among the states. 
There were other reasons, of course, for this change.  Dramatic changes in the 
economy made some see the emergence of large scale corporate concentration as 
necessary, if not inevitable.24  There was a decline in traditional corporate doctrines like 
ultra vires and quo warranto that had been used to cabin corporate acts and a similar 
shriveling of state efforts to assert control over foreign corporations.25  And there was 
widespread concern about overall changes in state law. Three American presidents in the 
early 20th century called for federal incorporation; each failed.26  Calls for federal 
incorporation reappeared at the time of New Deal efforts to combat the Great Depression, 
but President Franklin Roosevelt and the Congress opted only for a partial federal 
response—securities laws that emphasized disclosure to protect investors and 
                                                     
22 Charles Yablon, Historic Race Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise and Decline of New 
Jersey, 1880-1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 355 (2007). 
23 Harold W. Stoke, Economic Influences on the Corporation Law of New Jersey, 38 J. Pol. Econ. 551-557 
(1930). 
23 Rutledge, supra note xx at yy. 
23 Horwtiz, supa note xx at yy. 
24 Rutledge, supra note xx at yy. 
25 Horwtiz, supa note xx at yy. 
26 Robert B. Thompson, Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: 
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell and Sue, 62 L & Contemp. Prob. 215, 223 (1999). 
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shareholders (and additional regulation of brokers, mutual funds and holding companies 
that increased social control over the financial sector).27  
The New Deal pattern set the stage for the federalism dimension of “who makes 
corporate law” that continues to today.   Congress can, if it wishes, (and given the 
outcome of the New Deal era Supreme Court decisions on the commerce clause) preempt 
state corporations laws.  Even though Congress has not chosen to do so, it and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission have regularly imposed federal rules on corporate 
governance, usually motivated by a financial scandal or crisis that has pointed out failings 
of large corporations.  For example, federal rules force public corporations to have 
mostly independent directors on their boards and audit, compensation and nomination 
committees made up entirely of such directors.28  State law, consistent with the dominant 
laissez faire mode, has no requirements for who can be directors.29  Federal law requires 
key officers to certify key financial documents; state law lacks such requirement or 
specification for any governance role for officers other than as the directors may direct.30  
Federal law requires that shareholders be able to vote on executive compensation and to 
suggest other items for a shareholder vote (even though the outcome of all such votes are 
advisory only).31  Federal rules regularly use disclosure requirements to muscle 
                                                     
27 Adam C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices 
95 Va. L. Rev. 841-926 (2009). 
28 Sarbanes Oxleyy & dodd Frank 
29 See Del.cod Ann. tit. 8 §142. 
30 Dodd Frank; & Del. 142 
31 §14A & 17 CFR 240.14a-8. 
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management toward a desired substantive result.32  Litigation under federal antifraud 
disclosure rules provides key governance constraints on managers.33 
Mark Roe has suggested that Delaware’s role in corporate law is at the sufferance 
of the federal government.34  Delaware is aware that if it goes too far, it may provoke a 
federal intervention.  The result is a dance between the two key parties with the feds 
having the ultimate power given their constitutional preeminence.  The next part suggests 
a more dynamic and less power-oriented description of federalism now visible in 
corporate law. 
II. Twenty-first Century Corporate Federalism 
 
While the outlines of corporate federalism as suggested by Roe and others are 
clear, in this part I describe how contemporary corporate federalism is less of the power 
approach of traditional dual federalism allocating realms between governments and more 
of interactive federalism providing room for multiple roles by different levels of 
government.  The first part of this section describes the array of the current space in 
which federal and state governments are interacting in corporate governance. The second 
part suggests how contemporary discussions of federalism in other areas might shape the 
corporate federalism discussion. 
                                                     
32 Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon 
Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003). 
33 Id.  
34 Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588 (2003). 
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A. The Contemporary Space in which Corporate Federalism Appears 
The interstitial way in which the President and Congress have chosen to have 
federal law interact with state corporate law over the last 80 years is visible in many 
examples.  Many of them fit the template of traditional federalism, where courts are 
policing a line between federal and state domains, often finding insufficient justification 
to support federal occupation.35  This part first provides several prominent examples and 
then develops an alternative set that requires a different federalism description. 
1. Traditional Federalism Defining State vs. Federal Realms 
While federal law did not preempt state corporations statutes in the New Deal 
securities legislation, there was nevertheless the potential of substantial overlap between 
the two realms—shareholders who bought and sold securities and who were injured by 
misrepresentation related to those securities (often by the managers of the corporation) 
also suffered loss if the same or related action of those managers violated state law 
fiduciary duties.  After federal courts implied private rights of actions under antifraud 
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, courts had to resolve the relationship 
between state and federal law.  Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s and early 1970s 
permitted a broad overlap.  In Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty 
Ins. Co,, for example, the Court stated that Congress did not seek to regulate 
“transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement”  but then 
permitted  a federal action in a transaction that was essentially that.36  Six years later in 
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, a Court whose membership had shifted since the earlier 
                                                     
35 See dual federalism discussed in Part b of this section. 
36 Supt. Of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casiualty co., 404 U.S. 6, 9-12 (1971). 
12 
 
decision, applied a more conventional federalism analysis to a securities transaction 
overlapping with state corporate law, declining to permit a federal securities remedy and 
leaving the shareholders to their remedy under state law:  “the result would be to bring 
within the Rule a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state 
regulation….Absent a clear indication of federal intent we are reluctant to federalize the 
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, 
particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be 
overridden.”37 
 The Court in that same period followed a similar and traditional federalism 
analysis as to tender offer regulation, added to the federal securities law in 1968.  Some 
disappointed bidders sought to use the stated purpose of the Act “to insure that public 
shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required 
to respond without adequate information” to attack defensives tactics by management.38  
The Court declined to read the statute as going beyond disclosure to substantive fairness  
and lower courts declined to permit litigants to use this federal law or the commerce 
clause to challenge state laws that did not permit bidders a meaningful opportunity for 
success.39  
 The Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit has followed a similar traditional 
federalism approach in two opinions two decades apart that struck down rules 
promulgated by the SEC as intruding too much into state law.  In a 1990 decision, the 
court considered an agency rule banning midstream adoption by a corporation of a dual 
                                                     
37 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 4xx (1977).pin 
38 Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. 472 U.S. 1 (1985). 
39 Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp, 877 F.2d 496 cert. denied 493 U.S. 933 (1989). 
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class voting regime, for example, giving management a separate class of shares with 10 
or more votes per share and insuring that the holder of such shares would control a 
majority of votes even while having made a much smaller percentage investment in the 
company’s capital.40  The court rejected such a rule on federalism grounds, “The 
Commission would be able to establish a federal corporate law by using access to 
national capital markets as its enforcement mechanism.  This would resolve a long-
standing controversy over the wisdom of such a move in the face of disclaimers from 
Congress and with no substantive restraints on the power.”41  Two decades later the 
agency passed a rule providing some qualifying individual shareholders the right to 
nominate a candidate for director to be included on the company’s proxy.42  This time 
Congress had explicitly authorized such rule-making just before enactment of the rule.43 
Even so, a panel of the same court struck down this rule for the agency’s failure to 
adequately assess the economic effects of the new rule.44 
 Each of those examples reflects a federalism mindset focused on an “on-off” 
switch: there is a federal realm and a state realm and the judiciary is to umpire in which 
realm the particular action falls given the context and the statute enacted by Congress.45  
A similar bright line approach is visible in an adjacent area when the conflict is between 
federal securities law and state securities law.  From the initial passage of the federal 
securities act and for 60 years thereafter federal law permitted concurrent federal and 
                                                     
40 The Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir, 1990). 
41  Id at 412. 
42 Business Roundtable 
43 Dodd Frank section 
44 Business Roundtable  
45 See infra note xx. 
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state regulation of securities issuances.46  In 1996, in response to issuer frustration with 
dealing with multiple levels of regulators, Congress reversed the statute, now preempting 
state regulation for “covered securities”, a term defined to include most large issuers 
subject to federal regulation.47  A similar preemption occurred two years later as to state 
class actions based on allegations of misrepresentation if relating to covered securities.48  
As with the examples discussed above, the common federalism approach is to assume the 
activity is in one realm or the other and to plumb the statute or policy to see which place 
it belongs.  Such an approach reflects the dual federalism approach of the 1930s.49  While 
it could describe some issues of securities regulation, contemporary discussion is not an 
on-off switch but a more interactive analysis as developed in the following section. 
2. Interactive Federalism in the Corporate Space. 
More recent examples of federal-state interaction look somewhat different than those 
just described and show a more nuanced interaction between federal and state law.  
Congress has explicitly chosen not to embrace an exclusive and non-overlapping sphere 
in most areas of the corporate space so that a separate analytical framework in necessary 
to analyze federalism question. 
a. Misrepresentations in shareholder voting   
When the Supreme Court in J. I. Case v. Borak in 1964 found an implied private right 
of action under Rule 14a-9 for misrepresentations in proxy solicitations it expanded 
shareholder rights beyond what state law provided them vis a vis their managers and 
                                                     
46 15 U.S. C. §18 
47 SUSA 
48  
49 See infra notes xx-yy. 
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directors.50  Delaware’s statute, then as now, had no explicit requirement for any 
disclosure when a shareholder vote was sought nor specific enforcement provision 
beyond general fiduciary duty.51  Even though the Court a decade and a half later rejected 
the Borak reasoning, it declined to question the actual holding of the case so that the 
federal remedy continues to be available for shareholders whose proxy is being 
solicited.52  So look what has happened: the federal presence has receded, at least 
substantively, while Delaware has fully adopted the important parts of 14a-9 law for itself 
and become the major presence in disputes relating to proxy disclosure. 
Delaware courts first declared that directors’ fiduciary duty includes disclosing “fully 
and fairly all material information within the board's control when it seeks shareholder 
action.”53  In determining what is material, Delaware courts explicitly adopted the federal 
standard initially proclaimed in a Rule 14a-9 context by the U.S. Supreme Court in TSC 
v. Northway,: a statement is material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
investor would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”54  Delaware’s Chief 
Justice Leo Strine, in an earlier opinion written while he was on the chancery court, 
explained the efficiency in not retracing issues already resolved by federal law, in the 
context of the adequacy of disclosure related to directors conflicting interest, one of core 
issues of Delaware corporate law: 
Federal regulations and exchange rules address disclosure of this kind in a 
detailed manner that balances the costs of disclosing all past relationships 
against the need to give stockholders information about some prior 
                                                     
50 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
51 See e.g. Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc. 650 A 2d 1270, 1277 ( Del. 1994). 
52 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,442 U.S. 560, 576-78 (1979). 
53 Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del 1992). 
54 See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil. Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985). 
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relationships that, while not rendering directors non-independent of each 
other, are important enough to warrant disclosure. Those bodies of 
authority should not be lightly added to by our law.55 
If a shareholder has two remedies for disclosure violations, one at state law and one at 
federal law; which one would you pursue?  It turns out Delaware has additional remedies 
beyond those available under Rule 14a-9.  Revlon, for example, requires a board to get 
the best price when a company is up for sale.56  Or perhaps Blasius might be available 
which can invalidate board defensive tactics that interfere with the shareholder franchise 
unless the board can show a compelling purpose.57   These state law remedies can be 
much more valuable to shareholders than the federal remedy as shown in a well-known 
Delaware case, In re Topps Company Shareholders Litigation.58 Not only did the 
shareholder plaintiffs get an injunction until there was corrective disclosure, but the court 
required the board to release a potentially higher bidder from a Standstill Agreement that 
had effectively locked that bidder out of the bidding.  Not surprisingly, Rule 14a-9 suits 
are less often used, but the interaction between the two sets of laws has been instrumental 
to the evolution of a more complete remedy for shareholders. 
 Forum-shopping for litigation challenging mergers has recently created new space 
for disclosure litigation in federal courts.  The number of merger deals generating 
litigation increased substantially in the years after 2008, reaching 96% of all deals in 
large corporations in 2013.59.  Empirical findings that these lawsuits are typically settled 
without material benefit to the shareholders but with a significant fee to attorneys filing 
                                                     
55 In re Netsmart Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 924 A. 2d 171, 206 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
56 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
57 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 565 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
58  926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
59 (Cain et al. 2017) 
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the case provoked concern about this pattern and various calls for reform.  Perhaps the 
most visible change was push back from Delaware courts during 2015 and the January 
2016 decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery, In Re Trulia.60 There the court 
announced a policy of disapproval of merger disclosure settlements that did not benefit 
shareholders but did compensate attorneys.  Not surprisingly, there has been movement 
away from the Delaware courts to courts of other states or to federal courts for 
corporations incorporated under the laws of Delaware (and who therefore could bring suit 
there under the state law just discussed.  Cain, Fisch, Davidoff Solomon & Thomas, show 
an increased share of disclosure-only settlements occurring in federal courts—0 in six of 
eight years prior to 2010 rising to 18% of  settled cases in 2015 and 31%  in 2016 
(although still a fairly small in absolute number of cases.).61 
 It seems unlikely that such disclosure=only settlements presage a significant 
increase in the federal presence shareholder disclosure and voting cases.  And even here 
we see evidence of interactive federalism.  Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh 
Circuit in a 2016 endorsed and applied Trulia to a federal case: 
Delaware’s Court of Chancery sees many more cases involving large 
transactions by public companies than the federal courts of our circuit do, 
and so we should heed the recent retraction by a judge of that court of the 
court’s “willingness in the past to approve disclosure settlements of 
marginal value and to routinely grant broad releases to defendants and six-
figure fees to plaintiffs’ counsel in the process.62 
                                                     
60 In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
61 Cain et al 2016 year in review 
62  In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litigation, 832 F. 3d. 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016) 
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b. Misrepresentations as to shareholder buying or selling 
 The evolution of the 14a-9 remedy is more surprising in contrast to the adjacent 
evolution of the antifraud remedy available under Rule 10b-5.  Each provides an anti-
fraud remedy for shareholders-- the 14a-9 remedy in connection with shareholder 
decisions to vote and 10b-5 in connection with decisions to buy or sell.  Voting and 
selling are two of the three core rights provides to shareholders under state law (suing 
being the third).63  Logic might suggest some general alignment across the two functions.  
Yet as shareholder voting suits have prospered in state law, making use of prior federal 
developments just discussed, the opposite has happened as to shareholder buying and 
selling.  Shareholder class actions in federal law under Rule 10b-5 continue at a steady 
pace, even after the PSLRA in 1995 imposed more stringent restrictions of several of the 
elements required for plaintiff to recover and defendants continue to vigorously litigate 
each of the elements required for recovery.64  In contrast, Delaware precedent has made it 
very difficult to proceed with a class action under state law in a buying and selling 
situation. 65These cases are difficult to explain by reference to traditional federalism 
focused on blanket categories that are either state or federal. 
c. Changing the method for director voting 
There are other similar examples of the interactive element of corporate 
federalism.   The usual state law threshold required for a director to be elected is a simple 
                                                     
63 Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting 
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell and Sue, 62 L & Contemp. Prob. 215-242 (1999). 
64 Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings—2016 Year in Review 
65 Malone v. Brincat 722 A. 2d 5 (Del 1988).   
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plurality, i.e. more votes than the other candidate.66  But in most corporate elections, 
there is not any candidate other than the slate put forward by management.  The SEC, 
pursuant to its authority under Section 14(a) to regulate proxies, has required that issuers 
include a box by which shareholders can “withhold” their vote.  But even if a majority of 
shareholders withheld their votes, the candidate would still cross the plurality threshold.  
A shareholder .or a group of them could run their own candidate, but success there 
requires a shareholder to incur the expense of seeking proxies sufficient to get more votes 
than the management candidate, an expense that individual shareholders and even 
activists find daunting.  As a more economical alternative that still provides a strong 
communicative message to management, shareholders have sometimes pursued “majority 
voting” bylaws that requires a candidate who gets a plurality but less than majority to 
resign and may provide that board must look elsewhere for a replacement candidate (or 
alternatively under some bylaws to permits the board to decline the resignation or 
reappoint the director.)67  Governance is a process that flows back and forth between state 
rules and federal rules and intentionally so.  Federalism needs to adapt to such modern 
illustrations. 
d. Shareholder say on executive compensation 
The recently enacted federal requirement that shareholders vote on executive 
compensation has a similar effect.68  The federal requirement is precatory, that is to say 
advisory.  Executive compensation is in the province of the board, as is the entire 
management of the business under Delaware §141.  If the company’s executive 
                                                     
66 Del. Code ann. Tit 8 §216(3) (directors elected by plurality of vote). 
67 Charles r. t. O’Kelley & robert b. Thompson, Corporations and Other Business Associations, Cases and 
Materials, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th Edition (forthcoming 2017)  chapter 3. 
68 See supra notew xx. 
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compensation plan gets less than a majority of shareholder votes, it can still go into 
effect. Directors get to do that as part of their comprehensive power.  For this  “say on 
pay” process to have the desired effect, directors must willingly take the advice of their 
shareholders or shareholders must be willing to use their vote at a subsequent meeting on 
an issue they do get to decide under state law- that of picking directors.  It turns out that 
the mutual funds and other institutional investors that together own 70% or more of the 
shares in American corporations have been willing to use their vote against members of 
the compensation committee of corporations that fail to get sufficient support in the say 
on pay vote.  Indeed, some institutional investors are willing to trigger such opposition if 
the company’s pay plan gets a majority but less than a supermajority, say below 70 or 
80%.  Of course, this subsequent shareholder vote on directors may be a “withheld” vote, 
subject to the variations discussed above unless the institutional investor is willing to run 
a slate of candidates in opposition to the company’s slate. The role of proxy advisory 
firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), has been important in all of this in 
terms of putting pressure on boards. What we have, then, is a combination of state law 
rules on voting, federal law rules on advisory voting or withheld votes, and private 
ordering in the sense of institutional shareholders deciding the threshold at which they 
will employ each of their state and federal voting rights. 69 
e. Removing staggered boards 
There are other examples as well.  The rapid decline of staggered board over the 
last decade, after two earlier decades of seeming invincibility to shareholder efforts to get 
rid such a rule, reflects a similar combination to that just described.  Staggered boards 
                                                     
69 See Okelley & Thompson, supra note xx at chapter 3. 
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mean one third of the board is elected at each annual meeting so that at least two 
successive successful proxy campaigns must be run to get control of the board against the 
wishes of the incumbents. Few insurgents have been willing to tie up their capital for 
such a period.  The state law rules that require boards to approve of any change to the 
articles before those changes are put to a shareholder vote effectively gave the board a 
blocking position against efforts to remove the staggered board provision.  Even if 
shareholders succeeded in a getting a majority of votes on a 14a-8 proposal seeking the 
end of staggered boards, the board could decline to take action, as discussed above. Only 
when enough institutional shareholders were willing to vote against non-agreeing 
directors at the next election for directors (or made an effective threat to do so) were 
boards willing to take the step to agree to changes in the articles.  In the space of a few 
years staggered boards have practically disappeared from the largest American public 
corporations.70 
f. Voting by institutional shareholders 
Federal regulators, initially the Department of Labor overseeing fiduciaries of 
retirement funds held for the benefit of workers, required those fiduciaries to vote those 
shares held in various plans, something that plan managers had not often done given that 
economic incentives seldom made voting worthwhile.71  The result was to grow the 
business of proxy advisory firms in helping funds meet such requirements and in turn to 
introduce a new player in corporate governance.   
                                                     
70 Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Debate on 
State Competition over Corporate Charters. 
71 Paul Edelman et al. , Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359 
(2014). 
22 
 
This shared governance authority among state law corporate rules, various and 
often isolated federal rules, and the private ordering preferences of institutional investors, 
most of whom are agents for retirement plans, has dramatically changed corporate 
governance in the twenty-first century.  In the examples just described, the corporate 
governance moved away from the default rule of traditional corporate law, but it was not 
a change in state statutory or common law that directly produced the result. Nor was it 
the explicit displacement of state law by federal law.  It certainly did not reflect any race 
between different states. Most often, it was a (somewhat small) change in federal rules 
that generated greater activism by institutional investors to use one of the relatively few 
rights that traditional state law gives to investors.  This is federalism not like what we 
have seen before in corporate law and requires a somewhat broader conception of 
corporate federalism to fully capture it. 
 
B. Contemporary Theories of Federalism as Reflected in the Corporate Law Context 
 
Until the New Deal, “dual federalism” dominated the discussion of allocating who 
makes law under the American constitutional system.  State and federal governments 
were seen as having exclusive control of non-overlapping regions of authority; courts 
were charged with defining and monitoring the line.  At the time of the point of inflection 
of state law and continuing through the New Deal, corporate law would have been 
considered within the state realm, whether the particular state took a laissez faire or more 
regulatory view toward the law that was enacted.   After the economic and social 
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disruption of the Great Depression, the executive and legislative branches greatly 
expanded the regulatory state including the first federal securities laws with various 
sections addressed to corporate governance.  The Supreme Court’s acceptance during 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s second term of the broader federal presence in many areas 
led to a blurring of the “exclusive” regions for the federal government and the states so 
that “overlapping state and federal regulation has become the norm for many, if not 
most” areas of regulation.72   Thereafter, dual federalism was dead, but as Robert 
Schapiro observed, “its spirit continues to haunt contemporary discussions of 
federalism…the dualist conception of federalism as a line-drawing exercise persists.”73  
The Court of Appeals’ focus in the two Business Roundtable cases discussed in section 
IIA above suggests such a line-drawing focus. In contrast, the American discussion of 
federalism in recent decades has “has moved to a more dynamic or cooperative 
federalism approach in many areas that were formerly within the exclusive realm of the 
states, such as health, safety, and environmental protections.”74  And, it might be said for 
our purposes, corporations.   Various adjectives have been added to federalism to make 
this point and different authors have sometimes suggested different meanings for the 
same adjective.  Cooperative federalism, for example, could mean the federal government 
establishing national standards or permitting requirements and then delegating to the 
states to administer the regulation including whether to grant or deny permits.75   But it 
often means more of a shared role. Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson argue that such 
                                                     
72 Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony in Preemption Choice, 33, 40-41 (William W. Busbee ed. 
2009). 
73 Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 243, 243 (2005). 
74 Alexandra B. Klasse & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A 
Federalism Mismatch, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1801, 1830 (2012). 
75 David Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. Pa. 
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concurrent regulation results “in a regulatory regime superior to what could be achieved 
by independent activity of each one” citing benefits form “plurality, dialogue, positive 
redundancy, greater regulatory competition, policy innovation and resistance to 
monopolies and group capture.”76  For some, this approach to federalism pushes 
differences of opinion to be resolved in the political branches—for state governments for 
example to protect themselves in Congress, leaving courts to a more passive role.77  The 
Business Roundtable decisions discussed above might well fall short under this approach.  
What has sometimes been called Process Federalism emphasizes similar values, pushing 
as many decisions as possible into the Congressional sphere where states ae represented 
and using “clear statement rules” to incentivize more specific congressional findings and 
debate.78  State interests are better “protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the 
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations of federal power.”79 
The recent examples in corporate law discussed above illustrate the rich and more 
nuanced interaction that results when there are multiple points of entry for different 
parties in interest seeking to resolve disputes in a collective enterprise.  Even with a more 
passive judicial role, the process of Congress and the state governments setting forth rules 
would benefit from a more explicit discussion of which level of government is better 
suited to determine particular rights and rules.  Many such discussions derive from a 
rational choice model, looking to methods of maximizing social welfare, aggregating 
preferences, and responding to market failures in private ordering.  Consistent with the 
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federalism focus of this discussion, David Spence, drawing on work by Peter Menell & 
Richard Stewart and William Eskridge & John Ferejohn, among others, suggests four 
traditional rationales used to justify federal regulation of externalities and proceeds on the 
assumption that federal regulation is appropriate when one or more of these rationales 
applies.80 
• regulation at the lowest element of government that geographically 
encompasses the costs and benefits of the regulated activities, a rationale 
that would justify federal regulation for pollution that spills over state 
boundaries; 
• a focus on the capacity or willingness of state governments to regulate, for 
example, as in a race to the bottom context that has long been discussed in 
corporate law that if true would make reliance on state law questionable or 
if the jurisdiction is vulnerable to regulatory capture, which may be more 
likely in a smaller, concentrated jurisdiction than for the country as a 
whole; 
• a need for uniform standards, one justification given for the preemption of 
state securities registration requirements where issuers seeking to raise 
money across multiple jurisdictions complained of the expense of having 
to comply with 50 sets of state rules as well as the federal standards; 
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• if there is an important national interest in developing an asset or industry, 
for example when nuclear energy was first used and regulation was 
assigned to the national government. 
The particular characteristics of the corporate setting influence the strength of 
each of these rationales.  The most important distinguishing element in the corporate 
setting is the ability of corporations in any place in the country to choose their state of 
incorporation and thus the set of state law governance requirements.  The internal affairs 
doctrine, which is widely accepted across American jurisdictions means that questions of 
internal corporate governance are decided based on the law of the state of incorporation, 
even if they are brought in federal court under diversity jurisdictions or in the courts of 
another state which has jurisdiction.  This means only one state law matters, the 
corporation cannot be subject to 50 states as when it was selling securities prior to 1996 
or when it sells products or engages with consumers across the country and would be 
adversely affected by overlapping rules from the various states. Thus the third rationale 
above will likely not show up in the corporate law context. 
 Corporate governance is no doubt important to American competitiveness and 
could support an important national interest justification for federal regulation, but the 
ability of corporations to choose their state of incorporation reduces the power of this 
argument.  Even if one state, or many, had bad corporate laws, so long as corporations 
had the ability to choose a state with the preferred rules, whatever those might be, there 
would be little need for federal preemption (absent a prisoner’s dilemma type situation 
caused by a race to the bottom discussed below). 
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The first rationale, the spillover across state lines so the regulating state does not 
bear the full costs of the regulation (or the absence of regulation), costs which are felt by 
other states (for example downstream states in the case of air or water pollution) is less 
relevant in the corporate context than for fixed site pollution.  To the extent that the 
regulating/incorporating state has a different mix of constituencies affected by the law—
for example mostly managers/directors and fewer investors/employees there is potential 
for a kind of externalization.  This is usually discussed in corporate law if amplified by 
the possibility of a race to the bottom discussed immediately below. 
The rationale most often used to support federal regulation in corporate law (and 
which is vigorously contested) is the second rationale—where the states could find 
themselves in a race to the bottom in a context where states would prefer more stringent 
regulatory standards, but cannot sustain any cooperative effort to maintain those 
standards in the face of temptation in the form of opportunity to attract corporations and 
revenue from other states (or not lose home state corporations and revenue to other states 
with more permissive corporate laws).  The laissez faire changes that spread through state 
corporations laws beginning in the 1890s has suggested such a pattern to some.  Professor 
William Cary’s well-known article in the 1970s advocated federal incorporation 
standards as an antidote to the then 80- year old pattern.81  Cary’s article generated a 
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strong rebuttal from Professor Ralph Winter and others.82  The issue remains very much 
contested with multiple empirical studies on different sides of the issue. 
What is important for this discussion is that federal law for more than 80 years 
has regularly intervened to displace parts of state corporations law that were seen as too 
strongly favoring management, for example.  This is often depicted as a fight between 
directors/managers on one hand and shareholders on the other.  But as Professor Roe has 
shown, this pattern can perhaps be better explained by constituencies outside the narrow 
set.83  Employees, creditors, consumers or the public, who have little chance to be a 
player in debate under state law go to Washington to seek a more receptive law-maker.  
Of course, managers and investors can be tempted to seek alliances in Washington DC as 
well.  Even so the result of such appeals to the federal government pattern over the last 80 
has usually produced legal change in the direction of more regulation and fewer 
restrictions on management. 
III. Federalism’s Impact on the Current Race Between the States as to Who Makes 
Corporate Law 
 
The previous parts present the combination of state and federal law that make up 
contemporary corporate law in the United States.  Since the 1890s states have been able 
to compete for incorporations so that corporations can choose among the various state 
regimes for their governing law.  Since New Jersey’s 1896 corporations statute the 
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dominant approach for these state laws law has been decidedly deregulatory. The 
formerly regulatory pattern gave way to enabling statutes that preferenced private 
ordering over mandatory state rules, albeit with default rules that provided strong impetus 
for centralized control and specialization of function among various corporate 
constituencies.  Federal law has never formally supplanted the organizational structure 
provided by the states, but has regularly displaced particular aspects of the state system.  
The usual federal approach evidences a different philosophy than the long-prevailing 
view at the state level.  These rules typically override private ordering to place additional 
obligations on directors and officers or enhance the governance role of shareholders as a 
counterweight to centralized control.  As described in Part IIA, the result has been a 
shared governance space among state law, federal law and private ordering.  This part 
addresses how the particular way that federalism has developed in the corporate space 
affects the race between the states dimension of who makes corporate law. 
Delaware’s dominance of the race between the states is well-recognized.  About 
60% of publicly held companies in the United States are incorporated in that small mid-
Atlantic state and if the measurement criteria were modified to those entities that are 
incorporated outside of their headquarters state, Delaware’s share rises into the 80s.  
Delaware’s dominance brings real benefits to the state.  About 20% of the state’s budget 
comes from incorporation fees, reducing what the state needs to ask of its residents to 
support its governmental operations.  Its preeminence is shared by specific groups with 
the state.  The legal industry, and particularly the Wilmington corporate bar, enjoys a 
prominence and a book of business that would be unexpected for a city of only 70,000.   
The corporate service industry and related professions including local universities have 
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created distinctive expertise.  Perhaps the most visible advantage is seen in its state 
judiciary.  Most state supreme court justices have low visibility outside of their own state 
and trial judges even less.  The chief justice and other members of the Delaware Supreme 
Court and the five members of the chancery court make most American corporate law.  
These judges are feted across the country and internationally, invited to conferences and 
provided publication, teaching and post-retirement opportunities that are not available to 
other state judges.84 
Thus Delaware has good reason to care about its position in corporate law.   It 
faces two sets of challenges.  Another state might attempt to take Delaware’s place, just 
as Delaware surpassed New Jersey in the last century.  Alternatively (and both can 
happen at the same time) Delaware’s preeminence can be eliminated or reduced by 
increased federal regulation.  In theory challenges from other states could come from 
more than one direction i.e. states could push alternative governance rules that were 
either more or less regulatory than Delaware’s position.  New federal rules could likewise 
could move in a more or less regulatory direction.  Modeling of the space would need to 
include the multiple possible paths. 
In reality the choices are much more confined.  Given the history already 
discussed the starting point creates path dependencies.  Delaware and the other states start 
from a place that reflects a strongly deregulatory approach and at the same time a 
preference for centralized control.  The federal government, when it intervenes, almost 
always does so via regulation and limiting centralized control.  Given the constitutionally 
provided dominance of federal power, if used, in most contexts, including corporate law, 
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Delaware can’t go so far in preferring management that would wake the bear of federal 
action that would narrow the space within which state corporate law would be the 
governing rule. 
While states desiring to take business from Delaware could theoretically change 
their laws to be more regulatory and limiting director power or to move in the opposite 
direction, the reality is asymmetrical.  It is true that North Dakota’s 2007 revisions of its 
corporations statute adopted an intentionally shareholder friendly-approach, but the 
state’s effort have hardly been noticed by corporations thinking about reincorporation.85  
Any state that wanted to increase the power of shareholders would be competing against 
an already large federal footprint that the state change would not likely move the needle 
of governance enough to attract the desired attention (and revenue) from corporations. 
In contrast, Delaware has faced a considerably greater challenge from states 
desiring to make their corporations statues even more pro-management than Delaware.  
Several states, for example, have enacted mandatory staggered boards for their 
corporations thereby providing incumbents more insulation. Some states have also 
rejected Delaware’s enhanced fiduciary duty standards for takeovers seen as having the 
potential to tie management hands in such a setting.  Nevada has pushed further with 
changes such as permitting waivers of fiduciary duty of loyalty in its corporations, 
something that Delaware does not do.86 
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These, of course, are the kinds of changes in state law that would seem likely to 
provoke federal intrusion.  Mark Roe has pointed out a limiting factor that affects the race 
between states—the feds are much more likely to federalize Delaware law more than a 
state with a small market share.87  The result is to alter the risk to companies that could 
arise from future changes in a state’s law once companies have reincorporated.   Any 
state may go too far in a particular direction.  The now-traditional pattern of federal law 
responding to perceived tilts in Delaware law limits the risk of such changes in Delaware, 
but not in the states with a smaller market share.88  The recent study by Ofer Eldar and 
Lorenzo Magnolfi provides support for this view, showing Nevada’s growth has been 
concentrated in small firms with low institutional shareholder ownership, but not 
corporations more generally and suggesting Delaware would lose market share and 
millions in franchise taxes if it adopted the stronger management protections of Nevada.89 
Conclusion 
Determining “who makes corporate law” in 21st Century America requires 
understanding the interaction of three overlapping dimensions—the competition between 
the states, the choice between regulatory law and private ordering, and the relation of 
federal law to state law under current theories of federalism.  American corporate law 
scholars have tended to over emphasize the first and not updated their priors on the third.  
Thinking about federalism, reflected in the broader writings about the topic in the space 
beyond traditional corporate law, is much more interactive than at the time of Cary and 
Winter’s initial writings on the race between the states.  Numerous current examples of 
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corporate governance reflect an interaction of state law governance rules, federal 
regulation, and private incentives of participants that could not have been seen a decade 
ago.  The particular effect on the race between the stats is somewhat surprising—
federalism has bolstered Delaware’s position.    
  
